This paper explores the evolution of wages along the life-cycle of U.S. manufacturing plants. Real wages start out low for new plants, and increase along with productivity as plants survive and age. As plants experience productivity decline and approach exit, real wages fall. Moreover, for surviving new entrants wages rise slower than productivity, whereas for failing plants wages do not fall as quickly as productivity does. These empirical regularities are captured in a dynamic model of labor quality and quantity choice by plants subject to adjustment costs in both wages and employment. The model's parameters are estimated to assess the magnitude of adjustment costs and the degree of asymmetry in the cost of upward versus downward adjustments. 
Introduction
This paper provides evidence on the evolution of wages along the life-cycle of manufacturing plants using data from U.S. Census Bureau's Census of Manufactures over the period 1963-1997. First, some facts are presented on how the average wage paid by a plant changes as the plant enters an industry, grows, and ages, and as it approaches exit. Then, a dynamic model of plantlevel wage adjustment is built and estimated to account for the asymmetric pattern observed in the evolution of wages for growing versus declining plants. The extent of plant level real wage rigidity is assessed.
The analysis is motivated by the evolution of key plant-level variables in the U.S. quinquennial Census of Manufactures (CM). The CM waves were linked at the plant level to form an unbalanced panel over the period . A plant is observed at most eight times, when it appears in all waves of the CM. Using a plant's deflated revenue (total value of shipments), its deflated wage bill, and its employment, three ratios were constructed for each plant-CM wave observation:
1 (a) average wage -the ratio of wage bill to employment, (b) labor productivity -the ratio of revenue to employment, and (c) the ratio of wage bill to revenue, equivalent to the ratio of (a) to (b). Each ratio was then regressed on life-cycle indicators -a set of dummy variables indicating the number of the CM waves a plant has been observed prior to its exit and after its entry, up to five each. 2 The omitted category contains the plants that are more than twenty years away from their entry or exit, and the plants for which entry or exit do not fall into the sample period. Each regression also includes dummies for 4-digit SIC industry and CM wave interactions, to control for industry and time effects. The coefficient estimates for the life-cycle indicators are in Figure I .
First, consider the evolution of average wage in Figure Ia . New plants begin with an average wage roughly $2,700 lower than that of the omitted category. It takes at least twenty years for this gap to drop below $300. Average wage starts to fall as a plant approaches exit. Plants 1 Both wages and revenue are expressed in 1987 dollars. Wages were deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and revenue was deflated using industry-level deflators from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database (http://www.nber.org/data/nbprod2005.html). 2 Entry and exit events are defined as the first observation of a plant in an economic census and the last observation, respectively. The exact entry and exit dates are not observed, and may fall in between two census years.
twenty years away from exit have about $200 lower average wage than the omitted category.
This gap grows to $2,000 by the time of exit. The average wage for exiting plants is about $700
higher than that of new entrants. Wages tend to rise faster for surviving entrants than they fall for plants approaching exit, as indicated by the slopes of the two average wage profiles for the parts of the life-cycle on either side of the -axis.
Next, turn to the evolution of labor productivity in Figure Plants approaching exit, however, exhibit a small but statistically significant increase in this ratio. Failing plants on average spend a higher fraction of their revenue on wages compared to the omitted category.
Figure I overall reveals that new plants have increasingly higher average wage as they age and their labor productivity improves. Failing plants, on the other hand, have declining average wage and productivity as they approach exit. However, for failing plants wages do not fall as fast as they rise in the case of new plants that survive and grow. Furthermore, wages do not fall as fast as labor productivity does for plants approaching exit, and they do not rise as fast as labor productivity does for new plants that survive and age. The model in this paper considers the role of wage adjustment costs as a potential explanation for these observations.
The connection between firm tenure and wages can arise for several reasons. Older firms may have higher wages because their workers tend to be more experienced, and have more human capital and better skills. Established firms with higher survival likelihood are more likely to honor long-term wage contracts, which induce higher worker effort and lead to higher wages. On the other hand, young firms that face significantly lower probability of survival mostly for individuals rather than firms. 5 The focus here is on plant-level rigidities in real wage movements. Forward-looking plants anticipate the effects of inflation on output and factor prices in making decisions. Nevertheless, the model and its estimation can readily accommodate nominal terms.
Given that productivity dynamics is a fundamental driver of firm and plant dynamics, it is also important to understand how changes in productivity or profitability are connected to changes in wages. The model in this paper makes this connection explicit. 6 The specific mechanism that drives the evolution of wages is a plant's choice of the quality of its labor force in the presence of productivity shocks. The emphasis on labor quality is inspired by the findings of Brown and Medoff (2003) and Kölling, Schnabel and Wagner (2002) which suggest that worker quality accounts for a considerable portion of wage differential across plants of different ages. 7 A further motivation is the strong positive association at the firm level between labor quality and labor productivity (see, e.g. Griliches and Regev (1995) ).
In the model, labor quality is a factor of production, in addition to the quantity of labor.
Labor is not homogeneous, and changes in labor quantity along a plant's life-cycle are likely associated with changes in average quality of a plant's workforce, and vice versa. Worker quality can have alternative interpretations, such as a worker's skill or effort, the quality of a worker's output, or the degree of essentiality of a worker in the production process, all of which may be positively associated with wage. While a plant takes as given the wage per unit of labor quality, it can alter the average quality of its labor force, and hence, its total wage bill and average wage. This mechanism is embedded into a model of plant dynamics driven by idiosyncratic shocks to plant profitability and common shocks to wage per unit of worker quality. Under certain specifications of production technology, when a plant's profitability increases, the plant desires to increase both its employment and average quality of its labor force, and a decline 5 See, among others, Altonji and Devereux (1999), Bewley (1999) , McLaughlin (1994 McLaughlin ( , 2000 , Hall (2005a,b) , Blanchard and Gali (2007) . 6 Some recent studies tie firm-level productivity movements to wage changes using reduced-form econometric models. See, e.g., Fuss and Wintr (2009) . 7 The analysis here, however, does not attempt to disentangle the effect of worker versus plant characteristics on wage dynamics. The goal is not to explain away the differences in wages across plants at different stages of their life-cycles, but rather to explore the link between plant-level productivity dynamics and the evolution of wages along a plant's life-cycle.
in profitability induces a downward pressure on both labor quality and employment. These implications emerge in the data studied here. Adjustments in wages, however, have costs associated with them. These costs may curtail the extent to which wages can be changed.
Plants make their labor quantity and quality choices considering the effects of these choices on current and future adjustment costs.
Adjustment costs in wages may arise due to a variety of reasons. Exogenous shocks to wages can force a plant to alter its wages at a cost. For instance, some workers can exercise their outside options if their wages are not adjusted adequately when demand for their services rises in the economy. New plants experiencing favorable profitability shocks and fast growth may need to reorganize their labor force and adjust compensation to increase the average quality and, therefore, output. Similarly, as a plant experiences persistent episodes of low profitability, it may be forced to shed some of its employees with high quality, but who may be non-essential for the main activity of the plant, and in some cases, it may even reduce compensation for some workers. There need not be a reduction in nominal compensation. For instance, if a plant freezes nominal wages, real wages would fall when there is inflation. Some workers may also quit in anticipation of exit and the plant may then have to reorganize its labor force to maintain production. All of such changes and events, however, require costly adjustment to wages. Changing the average quality of a plant's workers entails costly training and search for workers with desired levels of quality. Unions can resist or prevent a reduction in average wage level, whether the reduction is direct through a cut in real wages and benefits, or indirect through firing workers at a particular quality level.
To uncover the underlying wage adjustment costs, the model's parameters are estimated.
The estimates reveal that labor quality, implicitly inferred from wages, is an important input to production. Furthermore, there are statistically and economically significant asymmetric adjustment costs associated with wages. Using the largest estimated adjustment cost parameters, upper bounds can be calculated for the share of wage adjustment costs in a plant's revenue.
The average annual cost of wage adjustment in any direction (up or down) over a 5-year period between two consecutive census years constitutes around 16% of a plant's initial revenue at the median of the adjustment cost distribution, when only the continuing plants are considered.
For continuing plants experiencing a fall in average wage, the annual adjustment costs claim on average about 36% of revenue. For continuing plants experiencing an increase in average wage, the annual adjustment costs make up around 08% of revenue on average. These shares are higher when only the exiting plants are considered: 3%, 66%, 12%, respectively. The revenue share of adjustment costs is even higher for plants in the higher quartiles of the adjustment cost distribution. Furthermore, wage adjustment costs tend to decline as a percentage of revenue as new plants survive and age, and increase as plants approach exit.
A version of the model with both wage and employment adjustment costs is also estimated.
The effect on plant value of a given change in employment depends on the corresponding change in worker quality associated with the employment adjustment. A plant may not be able to adjust employment up or down holding worker quality constant. Incorporating adjustments in worker quality can therefore account for some of the potential bias in the measurement of employment adjustment costs when labor is treated homogeneous. Similarly, not accounting for adjustment costs in quantity margin may bias adjustment costs in the quality margin. Estimates reveal that both margins of adjustment are important.
Adjustment costs associated with factors of production have been studied in the context of plant, firm, industry, and aggregate dynamics. 8 These studies mainly consider adjustment costs for labor or capital, but rarely focus on adjustment costs associated with factor prices, such as wages. The approach here differs from the previous literature in a number of dimensions.
First, it introduces wage adjustment costs explicitly at the plant level, allowing for adjustments both in response to exogenous changes in wages and to changes through the plant's choice of labor quality. Second, it considers the dynamic interaction between the choices of labor quality and quantity at the plant level. This interaction has implications not only for the time-paths of wages and employment, but also on the adjustment costs associated with both wages and employment. Third, it quantifies the relative significance of wage and employment adjustment costs. Finally, the data used here is much richer than those in previous studies. The analysis focuses on a subset of the LRD that includes eight waves of the Census of Manufactures (CM) : 1963, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 . Employment is a plant's total number of workers engaged in production and non-production 9 For further information on the LRD, visit http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/economicdata.html.
activities. The wages of individual workers in a plant are not observed, only the total wage bill is available. To obtain average wage, a plant's total wage bill was deflated to 1987 dollars using CPI from Bureau of Labor Statistics and then divided by the plant's total employment. 10 Labor productivity is defined as the ratio of a plant's revenue to its total employment. Finally, wage-bill-to-revenue ratio is a plant's total wage bill divided by its revenue.
Main findings
Underlying the evolutions of the three basic ratios described in Figure I is Table I , which contains the OLS estimates from several specifications of the following regression
where  indexes plants,  indexes census years,   is either average wage, labor productivity, or wage-bill-to-revenue ratio,    is an indicator of whether a plant is  ∈ {0 5 10 15 20} years to its exit point (the last census it is observed),    is an indicator of whether a plant is  ∈ {0 5 10 15 20} years away from its entry point (the first census it is observed), Z  is a vector of additional plant-level controls,   is a census year fixed effect, and   is a 4-digit SIC industry fixed effect. 1112 The interaction term     is added to control for any industry-time specific effects, such as the effects of industry life-cycles. The omitted category, referred to as mature plants, contains the plants that are more than twenty years away from their entry or exit, and the plants whose entry or exit dates do not fall into the sample period. 13 The error term   is assumed to have an unobserved firm specific component and estimation allows for clustered errors at the firm level to correct for standard errors.
The indicator variables    and    capture life-cycle effects. They track the evolution of   as a plant moves away from entry into maturity, and also as it approaches exit. Of interest are the coefficients    and    that quantify the magnitudes of these life-cycle effects.    is the effect on   of being  years away from exit, controlling for time from entry as identified by the 10 Wages do not include benefits. 11 The total employment of a plant was restricted to the range 5 to 10 000 employees. In addition, the top and bottom percentiles of the three dependent variables were trimmed to reduce the influence of any outliers on the estimated coefficients. 12 Note that some plants indicated by a given    may also be in the set of plants indicated by some   0  s. 13 The regression specifications are similar to those used in Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008). wage is low for entering plants and gradually approaches that of mature plants. As plants get closer to exit, wages start to fall, but not as fast as they increase for surviving and aging entrants. Labor productivity is also much lower for entering plants, but improves as they age.
Plants nearing exit have a more substantial productivity disadvantage, visible even twenty years prior to exit. Griliches and Regev (1995) find a similar pattern in a study of Israeli firms and dub this effect "the shadow of death": firms that will exit in the future are less productive in the present. However, the relative pace of wage and productivity growth in young plants differs from the relative pace of growth in failing plants. This asymmetry manifests itself in the evolution of wage-bill-to-revenue ratio. For young plants, wages constitute a smaller fraction of revenue compared to mature plants, and for plants approaching exit wage bill claims an increasingly larger fraction of revenue.
The findings largely continue to hold when plant-level controls, Z   are added. In specification II, plant size, which has been found to be highly positively associated with wages (see, e.g., Brown and Medoff (1989) ), is included, in addition to an indicator of whether the plant is part of a multi-unit firm. Plant size is measured by total employment and specified as a cubic polynomial. While the magnitudes of life-cycle effects in average wage are now somewhat smaller in absolute value, their signs and significance resemble those in specification I. The most important difference is in the case of labor productivity for young plants. Compared to specification I, young plants now exhibit a much faster productivity growth, and seem to wipe out their productivity disadvantage vis á vis mature plants by their fifth year after entry. As a result, wage-bill-to-revenue ratio for entering plants is even lower, and stays lower longer as they age. The results in Table I indicate that wages rise slower than labor productivity does for young plants as they survive and age, and they fall slower than labor productivity does for failing plants. Consequently, wages represent a smaller share of revenue for young and surviving plants, but a higher share of revenue for those plants nearing exit. Surviving plants appear to have a payroll advantage: they pay their workers a smaller share of their revenues compared to mature plants. Plants approaching exit, however, are burdened with a wage bill that claims a larger fraction of their revenue compared to mature plants.
Does the evolution of key variables in Figure I vary across different worker types? A broad categorization of a plant's labor force into production versus non-production workers is available in the data. Table II shows the evolution of average wage and other key variables for these two worker types, based on regressions (1) ran separately for each type. This breakdown is only a crude distinction of function among workers. Non-production workers category lumps together white-collar workers, including managers, sales, legal, and professional personnel, as well as many other types of employees who are not directly involved in production. 15 The average wage of non-production workers is roughly double that of production workers, a difference that is also highly statistically significant. 16 As suggested by this large gap, non-production workers may embody more skill, education, or human capital than production workers, at least on the average.
The first two columns of Table II present the evolution of the ratio of the number of nonproduction workers to the total number of workers, which is a proxy for a plant's skill composition. Regressions of the form in (1) were rerun with this ratio as the dependent variable   . New plants have a low ratio relative to mature plants, but as plants age, the ratio increases. However, even twenty years after entry plants exhibit lower ratio relative to mature plants. As plants near exit, this ratio tends to go down, but not as fast as it rises in the case of young plants, implying some asymmetry in the evolution of worker composition along the plant life-cycle. Figure II depicts these patterns.
Average wages for both types of workers start out low for new plants relative to mature ones, 15 See Gujarati and Dars (1972) for a detailed description of these two types of workers, as defined by the US Census Bureau. 16 In 1997 CM, the average wage for production workers was about $21,000, compared to about $39,000 for non-production workers.
but increase as plants age. Twenty years after entry, plants have about the same average wage for non-production workers as mature plants, whereas they exhibit about $200 lower average wage compared to mature plants for production workers. As a plant approaches exit, the average wages of both types of workers fall, with a larger decline for non-production workers. Plants in their last census year on average pay about $1,500 less to their production workers and about $4,500 less to their non-production workers, compared to the mature plants. These movements in average wages are shown in Figure III . One concern is that the estimated magnitudes are in absolute terms -not measured relative to the average wage in each category of workers.
The regressions using logarithm of average wage address this issue. Even when the change in average wage for a worker type is measured as a percentage of the average wage for that type, the pattern remains the same: the average wage of non-production workers rises faster than that of production workers as a new plant ages, and it also declines faster as a plant approaches exit.
The relatively higher inertia in production workers' wages may stem from several reasons. One reason is that they are more likely to be unionized. Another may be that they perform essential tasks for production and are harder to dispense with if a plant is to continue production during episodes of persistent low profitability. It may also be easier for highly-skilled non-production workers to quit and find alternatives when a plant approaches failure.
The last four columns of Table II present the evolution of wage-bill-to-revenue ratio for production and non-production workers. For both types of workers, this ratio starts out low in new plants compared to mature plants and gradually increases. However, failing plants seem to have a higher payroll share of revenue compared to mature plants when production workers are considered. This pattern does not apply to non-production workers. The evolutions of average wage and wage-bill-to-revenue ratio in Table I appear to be driven by two factors: (i) the asymmetry in the evolution of worker composition -a shift towards non-production workers as young plants age, and a shift towards production workers as plants approach exit, and (ii) the slower rise and decline in the average wage of production workers compared to that of non-production workers.
The model
The model is motivated by the empirical findings in the previous section. It considers both the quantity and quality of labor as factors of production. Worker quality can have alternative interpretations, such as a worker's skill level, effort level, the quality of a worker's output, or the degree of essentiality of a worker in the production process, all of which may be positively associated with wage. A key ingredient of the model is the ability of plants to alter their wages through adjustment of worker quality. Wage adjustments, however, have costs associated with them. Plants take unit wages per worker quality as given in a labor market where workers are heterogeneous with respect to quality. There are two distinct channels through which wage adjustments can occur. First, a plant can adjust its wages in response to changes in the exogenous wage rate per unit of worker quality. For instance, if the wages rise in the economy in general, a plant has to increase compensation to its workers in order to be able to retain them. The second channel is the ability of a plant to alter its wage bill through adjustment of its average worker quality. The higher the average quality of labor, the larger the output, but also the higher the wage bill. Labor quality can be altered by a plant through hiring, firing, and other means, such as investment into a worker's skill acquisition or training.
Consider now an industry with a large number of plants, each of which is too small to influence industry aggregates. Plants can be price-takers in the market for their output, or they may be local monopolies and can set prices given their downward sloping demand functions.
There is an infinite number of discrete time periods. Plants receive random shocks to their profitability each period. Plants are also exposed to economy and industry-wide shocks to an exogenous wage rate per unit of labor quality. There is a large number of workers with varying quality levels available for hire by plants at that exogenous wage rate.
Adjustment cost for wages
A plant chooses the quantity and average quality of its labor force, as well as other inputs, to generate output through a Cobb-Douglas production technology. 17 The profit function of a plant in period  is
In the production function represented by the first term on the left hand side of (2),   is the quantity of labor,   is the average quality or skill level per unit of labor, and   ≥ 0 is a profitability shock that includes aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, as well as the output price.
The parameters of the production function satisfy the restrictions   ∈ (0 1) and  +   1
These parameters are determined by the underlying importance of   ,    and other inputs in production. 18 In the cost function represented by the remaining terms on the left hand side of (2),   is the wage per unit of labor quality that evolves exogenously, and   ≥ 0 and   ≥ 0 are the parameters of the quadratic adjustment costs associated with upward and downward adjustments in average wage,
The quadratic is in terms of the conventional growth rate of     . 19 The adjustment in average wage applies to total wage bill from the previous period  −1  −1  −1  implying that the adjustment cost is proportional to plant size measured by  −1 . The dependence of wage adjustment cost on previous plant size introduces a dynamic link between a plant's employment and average wage choices, in addition to the interaction of these two choices in the production function and wage bill. The adjustment in average wage has two sources: exogenous changes in    and the plant's choice of   , which also depends on   and   . When the unit cost of worker quality changes, the plant has to incur an adjustment cost in wages even when it does not alter instance, if the elasticity of substitution between quality and quantity is 05 conditional on output, then the adjustment cost for quality would be multiplied by 2
18 Suppose the plant is a price-taker and the underlying production function is given by e   ³ 
´  where   is some other input that can be costlessly adjusted, e  e  ∈ (0 1) are the shares of labor quantity and quality in output such that e  + e   1 and  ∈ (0 1) reflects decreasing returns at the plant level to some fixed input (such as capital or physical space). If the unit price of   is   , the optimization only with respect to   leads to the production function in (2) where
 e     and output price    A similar interpretation applies if a plant has local market power, in which case  is a function of the elasticity of demand. 19 An alternative growth rate is also used for robustness, as explained below.
the average quality of its labor force. These two dimensions of adjustment are not separately identified. Finally,  is a fixed cost of operation that is avoidable only if the plant exits.
Labor quality   can alternatively be interpreted as the idiosyncratic component of a plant's average wage, which can be positively associated with the quality of the job a worker produces or the effort that the worker exerts. If the idiosyncratic component is lower, the worker exerts less effort and the quality of his output declines, resulting in lower output for the plant. The average wage     is then a multiplicative representation of its exogenous common (  ) and endogenous idiosyncratic (  ) components. 20 The distribution of   is given by the  (  | −1 ), which specifies the general dependence of a period's profitability shock on its previous value. Similarly, the distribution of   is given by the  (  | −1 ) The random variables  + and  + are assumed to be independent for  6 = . The distributions  and  are assumed to satisfy certain monotonicity properties with respect to  −1 and  −1  respectively. 21 Such monotonicity is satisfied by  distributions, as well as by more persistent processes. The exact forms of  and  are not specified. 22 In the estimation, the profitability and wage processes are driven by the data, instead of being specified as part of the model.
It can be verified that the profit function Π is strictly increasing in   , and strictly decreasing in  −1 and    23 Define the state variable for a plant as
decision to exit after observing   is denoted by the discrete choice   such that   = 1 if the plant exits, and   = 0 if the plant continues. Letting  denote the discount factor, the value 20 An additive form,   +    can also be specified, where   is the plant-specific component of wage. Now,
´a nd define a worker's effort or the quality of his output proportional to wage as
one can obtain the multiplicative specification
common across firms,   preserves the ranking of the idiosyncratic component across plants. Choice of   by a plant is equivalent to choice of   in this case. 21 Specifically, for any non-decreasing function ,
is non-increasing in  −1 . These assumptions are needed for the existence and monotonicity of a plant's value function. 22 Prior evidence suggests that   is persistent. A frequent specification (see, e.g., Hopenhayn (1992), Fishman and Rob (2002)) is for any two shocks
 Some studies (e.g., Abraham and White (2006) ) find high persistence in productivity at the firm level. 23 Monotonicity in   ,    and  −1 follow from straightforward differentiation, except at
where the plant's exit value is normalized to zero. The expectation in (3) 
where
The first term on the left hand side of (4) is the marginal benefit from a small change in the quantity of labor, and the second and third terms give the associated marginal cost: the change in current wage bill and the change in the next period's expected adjustment cost. A continuing plant's choice of   satisfies
24 Assumptions 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, and 9.7 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) are satisfied for the firm's dynamic programming. Furthermore, Assumptions 9.8 and 9.9 are satisfied for the state variables  −1 and    Monotonicity then follows from Theorem 9.7. Similarly, assumptions 9.13-9.15 are satisfied for the state variable    Monotonicity then follows from Theorem 9.11. 25 Note that the derivative of  with respect to   does not exist at
Once again, the first term on the left hand side of (6) is the marginal benefit from a small change in quality of labor and the remaining terms are the associated marginal cost: the change in current wage bill, the change in current adjustment cost, and the change in the next period's expected adjustment cost. The first order conditions (4) and (6) implicitly determine the policies (s  ) and (s  ) Let Π * (s  ) be the period profit function evaluated at (s  ) and (s  ). The exit policy is then given by the following
otherwise.
One can assess the implications of the model on wage bill-to-revenue ratio. Using (4), the wage bill can be expressed as a percentage of revenue as
Using (5) in (8) one then obtains
is the expected value of the squared percent adjustment in the next period conditional on   and    An implication of (9) is that higher absolute expected percent adjustment in average wage in the next period is accompanied by a lower share of labor in current period revenue.
This result follows because the plant's current wage bill and its expected cost of adjustment in wages next period must be compensated by the labor's share of current revenue.
The expectations in (10) are taken over  +1 and  +1  conditional on   and    If  +1 is strictly increasing in   conditional on    better profitability shocks (higher   ) imply a lower   . The outer expectation in (10) applies to the stochastic process    which is common to all plants and independent of   . Thus, in comparing the value of (9) 
Adjustment costs for wages and employment
Consider now adjustment cost for employment, in addition to that for wages. Consideration of adjustment in worker quality next to adjustment in worker quantity addresses the issue that labor is not homogeneous. The effect on plant value of changes in employment depends on the associated changes in worker quality. Incorporating adjustments in worker quality can therefore account for some of the potential bias in the measurement of employment adjustment costs when all labor is treated homogeneous. Similarly, a change in employment rarely can be accomplished holding average wage or average worker quality constant. For instance, hiring or firing a worker changes the average quality of the remaining workers. Including adjustment costs in both quality and quantity helps address the effect of changes in one on the other. The period profit function of a plant is now For a continuing plant, the first order condition for   is the same as (6). For    the first order condition now becomes 26 
Adjustment costs with alternative growth rates
As an alternative to the adjustment cost specification used so far, an adjustment cost which allows for symmetric and bounded growth rates can also be considered. The alternative adjustment cost specifications for average wage and employment are given by replacing the denominators of the squared terms in (2) and (11) with
respectively. These alternative specifications restrict the growth rates in average wage or employment to the interval [−2 2]. These growth rates have some desirable features compared to the conventional growth rate, such as robustness to outliers and boundedness. 27 The appendix contains the first order conditions for the adjustment costs with alternative growth rates.
Estimation

Estimation with adjustment cost for wages
Consider first the model with adjustment cost for wages only. Condition (6) can be rewritten after multiplying through by   as
Multiplication by   ensures that average wage     appears in the first order condition, rather than just    The former can be calculated using a plant's wage bill and employment, whereas the latter is not directly observed. Note that the labor quality   is also unobserved. Consequently, the parameter  as well as   and   , are inferred from wages and output. The implicit assumption is that the endogenous part of the wages at the plant level is proportional to labor quality. This approach differs from those that use direct measures of labor quality 26 Note that  is now non-differentiable with respect to   at   =  −1 when   6 =    27 See Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) for a discussion of this growth measure. based on observable worker characteristics, such as education and experience. The advantage of this approach is that the the estimation of returns to labor quality here does not require a specific measure or index of labor quality, or the estimation of an earnings function. 28 Profit maximizing conditions are not likely to be exactly fulfilled for several reasons, such as managerial errors originating from inertia and ignorance. Such errors can result in deviations from the plant's ideal choices. Another source of ex-post deviations from optimality is the difference between anticipated and realized output price and exogenous wage rate per unit of quality. These idiosyncratic errors and deviations are assumed to be randomly distributed over plants. Following Hansen and Singleton (1982) , the ex-post error can be expressed, using (7) and (13), as a function of the parameters
The ex-post error in labor choice, after using (4) and (5), is
Equations (14) and (15) are used in a generalized method of moments (GMM) framework to estimate the parameters Φ = {       } The discount factor is set to  = 078 for the quinquennial data, which corresponds to a 95% discount rate for annual data.
The estimation can be readily applied to continuing plants. For exiting plants, the decision variables are not observed for the period after they exit. However, the event of exit contains additional information about the parameters of interest, as exit probability depends on the parameters 
The GMM estimation can be carried out using equations (14) and (15) for continuing plants and equations (16) and (17) for exiting plants. It is important to include exiting plants in the estimation as not doing so could induce bias in both the production function and adjustment cost parameter estimates. The estimation is done separately for continuing plants and all plants (continuing and exiting) to assess this potential bias.
Estimation with adjustment costs for wages and employment
For the case with both employment and wage adjustment cost, the ex-post error for   is
The ex-post error for   is the same as (14) .
For exiting plants, the ex-post error for   is
and the ex-post error for   is the same as (16) . The parameters to be estimated are now
The estimation involves endogenous variables that are simultaneously determined. These are current revenue, employment, and average wage. The instruments used for endogenous variables are lagged revenue, value added, wage bill, average wage, and their interactions with current-period revenue, employment, average wage and value added, all deflated. 29 Similar estimation procedures apply to the case of adjustment cost with alternative growth rate using the first order conditions in the appendix.
It is important to note that, as in most previous studies, estimation is based on net, not gross, changes in wages and employment. Gross changes are not available in the data used here. In a simulation study based on annual frequency, Hall (2004) finds that adjustment cost is understated when it applies to gross investment instead of net for the case with fixed cost of adjustment and no firm specific shocks -two features not present in the model here.
Results
The GMM estimates of parameters using the entire sample of manufacturing plants are reported in Table III 
Estimates of production function parameters
In all specifications, the estimates for the production function parameters  and  are very precise, have the expected signs, and fall in the interval (0 1). As shown in the top panel, the estimated value of  +  when revenue is measured by the value of shipments range from 017
to 055 This range also contains the estimated labor share of output, about 040 obtained by estimating the specified Cobb-Douglas production on the same sample of plants in a static 30 With the exception that for  = 1967 the previous census year is 1963, corresponding to − 4 31 In all specifications in Table 3 , the top and bottom 1% of the plant level distributions of average wage, wage bill-to-revenue ratio, and labor productivity were trimmed to reduce the influence of some major outliers. The total employment of a plant was also restricted to the range 5 to 10 000 employees.
model with no adjustment costs. When value added is used as the revenue measure in the bottom panel, the estimates of  and  are much higher, and still highly significant. The estimates of  +  are in the range 049 − 083 which also contains the point estimate of labor share, about 080 obtained from the static version of the model without adjustment costs based on the same sample of plants. The estimates of  exceed those of  in most specifications in the top and bottom panels in Table III , pointing to the importance of the labor quality share in the specified production function. 32 
Estimates of adjustment cost parameters
In most specifications in Table III, with the data, moving from the unconstrained to the constrained estimation should not result in drastic sign and significance changes in adjustment cost parameters, such as a shift in a parameter estimate from negative and significant to positive and significant. Estimates of  and  in Table A .I are generally similar to those in Table III , and they are actually somewhat larger in cases where revenue is measured by value added. Also notable is the fact that almost all of the negative estimates of upward adjustment cost parameters in Table III are now zero -none has become positive and significant. This observation suggests that the upward adjustment cost parameters may indeed be not too far from zero, and the negative estimates in Table III 
Assessing the magnitude of adjustment costs
Because the percent adjustments in wages and employment apply to different bases in the adjustment cost specifications, it is not appropriate to simply compare the estimated magnitudes of   and    or   and    to gauge the relative importance of different adjustment costs. The approach here is to assess the importance of the cost of adjustment for wages versus employment by comparing the shares of the average annual wage and employment adjustment costs in a plant's initial revenue over a 5-year window between two censuses. These static shares, however, do not take into account the dynamic effects of adjustments. In any period, a plant may incur a loss net of adjustment costs to ensure future profitability. The adjustment costs are calculated over a 5-year period between two census years  and  + 5, whereas the current revenue is calculated for census year . The adjustment cost incurred in census year  changes the value of the plant in the future.
Table IV presents quartiles for the estimated revenue shares of adjustment costs based on the parameter estimates in Table III . Rather than picking a certain specification arbitrarily, for each adjustment cost parameter its maximum estimate across all specifications for the case of total value of shipments in Table III is used to obtain the estimates in Table IV .
This approach provides an upper bound on the revenue share of adjustment costs, given the estimation methodology and the sample used. Panel (a) considers estimates from the models using continuing plants only, corresponding to specifications I and III in Table III . For the model with wage adjustment only, at the median adjustment cost, the adjustment cost is 08% of revenue when all directions of adjustment are considered together, and around 04%
and 2% when upward and downward adjustments are considered, respectively. For the model with both wage and employment adjustment, wage adjustment cost is about 10% of revenue at the median wage adjustment cost, and upward wage adjustment cost constitutes about 06% of revenue, while downward wage adjustment cost makes up about 16% of revenue.
Employment adjustment cost has a significant share (nearly 4%) of revenue at the median employment adjustment cost when downward employment adjustments are considered. For upward employment adjustments, this share is about 3% at the median employment adjustment cost.
A similar pattern emerges in panel (b) of Table IV , which focuses on the estimated parameters using all plants, corresponding to specifications II and IV in Table III . For the model with wage adjustment only, upward and downward wage adjustment costs make up, respectively, about 08% and 35% of revenue at the median wage adjustment cost. For the model with both adjustment margins, these shares are about 01% and 32%, respectively. For employment adjustment, upward adjustment cost is about 59% of revenue, whereas the downward adjustment cost constitutes about 82% of revenue, both measured at the median employment adjustment cost.
Adjustment costs constitute a much larger fraction of revenue when only the exiting plants are considered, as panel (c) of Table IV indicates. For almost all model specifications and for both upward and downward adjustment, the shares in panel (c) are much higher compared to panels (a) and (b). In particular, at the 3rd quartile of the adjustment cost distribution, downward wage adjustment cost makes up around 25% of revenue for the model with wage adjustment only, and about 14% of revenue for the model with both adjustment margins.
These magnitudes suggest that downward adjustment costs can be a substantial burden for plants, especially for those nearing exit.
How much do adjustment costs in wages change over the life-cycle of a plant? The evolution of adjustment costs along the plant life-cycle is shown in Figure IV for continuing plants. These estimates are based on the largest adjustment cost parameter estimates from the model with wage adjustment cost only using all plants, corresponding to specifications labelled II in the left panel of Table III , which also generate the left side of panel (b) in Table IV . For plants that are five years from their first census, wage adjustment cost makes up about 23% of revenue at the median. This share increases slightly as new plants age and then declines to just below 16%
by the time a plant is 20 years away from entry. Somewhat reversal of this pattern emerges for plants approaching exit. Wage adjustment cost grows to about 22% of a plant's revenue five years before its exit, doubling from about 11% when a plant stands twenty years from exit.
In summary, the estimates of production function parameters suggest that the quality of labor is an important input in production when compared to the quantity of labor. In many cases, the quality's share of revenue exceeds that of quantity, as indicated by the relative magnitudes of the estimated  and  Both the quality and quantity margins of adjustment matter. Evidence also points to asymmetric adjustment costs both for wages and employment.
Upward adjustment costs are smaller compared to downward adjustment costs, both for wages and employment. Plants nearing exit bear a larger burden in terms of downward adjustment in wages and employment. The downward adjustment costs are also considerable even for continuing plants.
Estimation using annual frequency data
The estimation so far was carried out using the CM, which has a quinquennial frequency.
The estimates for annual adjustment costs were obtained using this frequency. It may be argued that the longer time period between the two consecutive observations of a plant could lead to lower adjustment cost estimates, as plants may have more flexibility to adjust over a longer horizon. If adjustment costs are highly convex, plants would have an incentive to spread adjustments over time, rather than undertaking large adjustments at once. As a robustness check, the estimation is repeated using annual frequency data from the US Census Bureau's Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). As in the case of the CM, plants were linked over time to identify entry, exit, and continuation. The unbalanced panel constructed from the ASM has a number of important differences from the panel from the CM. First, ASM pertains mainly to plants that are relatively large. 33 The sample is thus subject to some non-random selection. Furthermore, a plants may enter to or drop from the ASM panel simply because its size changes to a level that is above or below the threshold of inclusion with certainty in the ASM. Second, the sampling frame for the ASM changes every five years, implying that some plants may enter, whereas others may be dropped from the sample over time. Therefore, actual plant entry/exit do not necessarily coincide with entry to/exit from the sample. The results based on the ASM are thus expected to differ from the ones based on the CM for reasons in addition to the differences in the frequency of observation. Moreover, two years of prior data are required for instruments used in GMM, so plants can enter the sample as early as their third year of the ASM.
34
The results from the GMM estimation based on the ASM panel are in Table A .II. These results were obtained under constrained estimation as in Table A .I, and sample weights in the ASM were used to obtain the population estimates. The results appear to be qualitatively similar across Tables A.I and A.II. Most importantly, downward adjustment costs are still larger than upward adjustment costs, and upward adjustment costs are generally close to zero for both wages and employment. However, there are a few important differences. First, in Table A.II estimates of production function parameters  and  are generally smaller. This discrepancy could be driven by the fact that the plants in the sample used for the results in Table A.II are much larger, and may have different production technologies compared to smaller ones that are in the sample used for the results in Table A .I. Second, downward employment adjustment cost parameter estimates are much larger compared to those in Table A .I, whereas downward wage adjustment cost parameter estimates have comparable magnitudes in many specifications.
These patterns suggest that downward adjustment costs may be higher in the short term for employment. Overall, the estimates indicate that the frequency of adjustment may not be The estimates of labor adjustment costs in this paper are within the range of the estimates found in these previous studies, though here there is evidence of significantly asymmetric adjustment costs for both wages and employment. The estimates indicate a small upward employment adjustment cost, but relatively large downward employment adjustment costs. Furthermore, as shown in Table IV , wage adjustment costs are smaller when wage adjustment costs are estimated together with employment adjustment costs. This finding suggests that not controlling for labor quantity adjustments may introduce some bias in adjustment cost estimates for labor quality, and vice versa.
Conclusion
This paper investigated the dynamics of wages along the life-cycle of manufacturing plants. such as benefits, can also be introduced. It is also promising to investigate the differences in adjustment costs for wages of production vs. non-production workers. The empirical analysis suggests that the former is likely the main driver of the patterns observed in this paper. It is also important to consider adjustment costs in other key inputs, such as capital, to assess the relative magnitudes of different adjustment costs and to reduce any potential biases due to omission of adjustment costs in capital. 35 Finally, the estimation can also be readily applied to establishments in non-manufacturing industries, for which census data contain only revenue, payroll, and employment.
35 See Bloom (2009) for estimates of adjustment costs for both labor and capital using firm level data for large, publicly traded firms only.
Total differentiation of (19) and (20) with respect to   results in the system
which has the solution
The coefficients of the system (21) are given by
For (s  ) and (s  ) to be strictly increasing in    one of the following must hold
Thus, any restrictions on the model's parameters that guarantee (22) or (23) would be sufficient.
Consider a set of sufficient conditions that leads to (22) . Conditions that ensure (23) can also be derived similarly. Assume first that  0, implying that the partial effect of an increase in   on the expected marginal cost of adjustment in period  + 1 is negative -this would be the case, for instance, if the stochastic process defined by ( +1 |  ) is such that a higher current period profitability shock   implies a distribution of next period shock  +1 that assigns higher density to those shocks that render a smaller adjustment cost. In addition, assume that   0 i.e. the net marginal effect on plant value of an increase in   is strictly decreasing as   increases. 36 Under these assumptions, the coefficients of the system (21) have the following signs:       0 and   0 These signs imply that  −   0 and  −   0, ensuring that
Finally,  −   0 is needed for
Now consider the terms on the  of (24 
First order condition for   :
Because it was already assumed that
is sufficiently large in absolute value so that it overwhelms the positive terms in 
B.2 Adjustment costs for wages and employment
First order condition for   :
First order condition for   : 
